Sigma rule: AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account

Rule

Title

AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account

Status

test

Level

low

Author

Elastic, Austin Songer @austinsonger

Date

2021-07-22

Modified

2022-10-09

File

rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.yml

Commit

ccbb0369507f796db0b0ae6854c8a2be471b9d84

Detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.

Log source

product

aws

service

cloudtrail

Detection

selection:
    eventSource: route53.amazonaws.com
    eventName: TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount
condition: selection

False positives (as the rule lists them)

• A domain may be transferred to another AWS account by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Domain transfers from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.

Tags

• attack.persistence
• attack.credential-access
• attack.privilege-escalation
• attack.t1098

MITRE ATT&CK ids this rule names

• T1098

References

• https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.toml

Read on 2026-11-03T00:58:21.399Z under licence sigma-drl-1.1@d5f4c36a from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ccbb0369507f796db0b0ae6854c8a2be471b9d84/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.yml