Sigma rule: Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
A detection rule from the SigmaHQ repository, shown as its author published it. Dataset version ref-ee1e25c2e4d3, updated 2025-03-19T00:00:00.000Z.
Rule
- Title
- Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
- Status
- experimental
- Level
- high
- Author
- Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
- Date
- 2025-03-19
- File
- rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_lnk_exec_hidden_cmd.yml
- Commit
- ccbb0369507f796db0b0ae6854c8a2be471b9d84
Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260-character UI limit while the actual command-line argument field supports 4096 characters using whitespace padding (e.g., 0x20, 0x09-0x0D).
Adversaries insert non-printable whitespace characters (e.g., Line Feed \x0A, Carriage Return \x0D) to pad the visible section of the LNK file, pushing malicious commands past the UI-visible boundary.
The hidden payload, executed at runtime but invisible in Windows Explorer properties, enables stealthy execution and evasion—commonly used for social engineering attacks.
This rule flags suspicious use of such padding observed in real-world attacks.
Log source
- product
- windows
- category
- process_creation
Detection
selection_img:
- ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
- ParentCommandLine|contains: '.lnk'
selection_cmd:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' ' # Padding of SPACE (0x20)
# - ' ' # Horizontal Tab (0x9)
- '\u0009'
- '\u000A' # Line Feed
- '\u0011'
- '\u0012'
- '\u0013'
- '\u000B' # Vertical Tab
- '\u000C' # \x0C
- '\u000D' # \x0D
- CommandLine|re: '\n\n\n\n\n\n' # In some cases \u000[ABCD] are represented as a newline in the eventlog
condition: all of selection_*False positives (as the rule lists them)
- Unknown
Tags
- attack.initial-access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
MITRE ATT&CK ids this rule names
References
- https://syedhasan010.medium.com/forensics-analysis-of-an-lnk-file-da68a98b8415
- https://thehackernews.com/2025/03/unpatched-windows-zero-day-flaw.html
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/windows-shortcut-zero-day-exploit.html
Read on 2026-11-03T00:58:21.399Z under licence sigma-drl-1.1@d5f4c36a from https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ccbb0369507f796db0b0ae6854c8a2be471b9d84/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_lnk_exec_hidden_cmd.yml
Sources and licences
SigmaHQ
"Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters" by Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ). Rule: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ccbb0369507f796db0b0ae6854c8a2be471b9d84/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_lnk_exec_hidden_cmd.yml.
Licensed under the Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License
Cite this page
Dragons Eye Ransomware Tracker, "Sigma rule: Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters",
entity page, dataset version ref-ee1e25c2e4d3, updated 2025-03-19T00:00:00.000Z,
https://ransomware-tracker.com/detections/sigma/dd8756e7-a3a0-4768-b47e-8f545d1a751c (accessed 2026-11-03).
Underlying source: SigmaHQ rule dd8756e7-a3a0-4768-b47e-8f545d1a751c, commit ccbb0369507f796db0b0ae6854c8a2be471b9d84.
Pages change. The dataset version identifies the data, but no archive of old versions is kept, so this citation cannot be replayed later.